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FOREWORD
Continuing instability in Somalia has increased
concern that terrorists who seek to establish a foothold in Africa may use such insecure places as a safe
haven and launching pad. Several attempts have been
made to establish lawful governments in Somalia;
however, warlord and clan interests have managed to
take center stage among the population. The Somalibased al-Shabaab (also known as the Mujahidin Youth
Movement [MYM]) is a militant organization born out
of both successive regional turmoil and international
salafi-jihadi ideology, which continues to actively undermine the United Nations (UN)-supported African
Union (AU) peacekeeping force, the fledging Somali
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and all UN
efforts to support Somalis in creating a stable state.
Al-Shabaab’s ability to orchestrate a strategic communications campaign has resulted in support from both
al-Qa‘ida and Usama bin Laden, as well as funding
and personnel recruitment from pockets of Somali diaspora throughout the world.
While U.S. administration officials deny direct
U.S. support for AU forces, AU leadership claims the
contrary, suggesting direct U.S. military support has
been crucial to fighting al-Shabaab over the past few
years.
Any direct effort the United States undertakes
in favor of the TFG against al-Shabaab and its associated militias must involve a whole of government
approach focused on the areas where al-Shabaab has
demonstrated vulnerabilities. Such interagency action
to leverage these vulnerabilities will certainly limit
al-Shabaab’s strategic, operational, and tactical (SOT)
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prowess more than military campaigns and objectives
alone.
The authors of this monograph identify al-Shabaab
SOT vulnerabilities organized according to four
sources of national power: diplomatic, informational,
military, and economic (DIME). After exploring the
group’s inherent and apparent weaknesses, the authors then provide some suggestions on what efforts
or capabilities may be leveraged in defeating and deterring the group. Such instruments do not have to be
kinetic or military in nature, but can be diplomatic,
economic, or persuasive. The authors concentrate on
those diplomatic and informational options and do
not address the military or economic implications at
this time.
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The influence of Islam on governance and clan
politics has both negatively and positively affected
the people of Somalia. It has facilitated justifying the
removal of national, regional, and grassroots or clan
leadership, especially if socioeconomic conditions and
quality of life standards have been degraded or the
leadership failed to ensure the safety of the people.
Additionally, charismatic clan leaders have leveraged
the low level of education among the Somali population to incite leadership changes. On a positive note,
enforcement of Islamic law (Sharia) has been a major
factor in helping to stabilize the lawlessness that has
gone unchecked throughout the ungoverned parts of
Somalia. By establishing courts and increasing the appointment of judges, Islamic leaders have attempted
to bring normalcy to people’s daily lives, amid all
the street-level battles, clan intra and interconnected
struggles for leadership and influence, and the presence of foreign fighters on both sides of the conflict.
The al-Shabaab Organization, also known as
the Mujahidin Youth Movement (MYM), and its allies have been active opponents in undermining the
United Nations (UN)-supported African Union (AU)
peacekeeping forces, the fledging Somali Transitional
Federal Government (TFG), and all the UN efforts to
support the Somali people. Al-Shabaab’s use of the internet and control of the local news media has resulted
in its ability to disseminate its story to the Somali public, to sympathizers throughout the world, and to the
greater Islamic community. It is able to accomplish its
strategic communication campaign through the use of
organic websites, publication of online magazines and
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newsletters, and with international press conferences
and interviews.
If the last 2 years is an indicator of what may happen in Somalia, the United States needs to consider undertaking a more direct role in limiting the demise of
the TFG, and extending itself to counter any advances
that al-Shabaab may gain. However, as military leaders and policymakers have suggested, this effort to
limit the advances of al-Shabaab must be focused and
involve a whole of government approach. This whole
of government approach must be focused on the areas
where al-Shabaab has been shown to have vulnerabilities.
The authors of this monograph identify alShabaab’s strategic, operational, and tactical vulnerabilities organized according to four sources of
national power: diplomatic, informational, military,
and economic (DIME). After exploring the group’s
inherent and apparent weaknesses, the authors then
provide some suggestions on what efforts or capabilities may be leveraged in defeating and deterring the
group. Such instruments do not have to be kinetic or
military in nature, but can be diplomatic, economic,
or persuasive. The authors concentrate on diplomatic
and informational options and do not address the military or economic implications at this time.
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SOMALIA:
LINE IN THE SAND—
IDENTIFICATION OF MYM VULNERABILITIES
INTRODUCTION
The disintegrating state of Somalia is located at the
strategic crossroads of Africa and the Middle East, with
one foot mired in clan warfare and intra-Horn of Africa’s politics, and another stretching across the Red Sea
into an increasingly globalized salafi-jihadi and maritime struggle. The region is important to the United
States for reasons of naval security and commerce, but
also for the protection of troops stationed in Djibouti
and continuing counterterror (CT) efforts in the Horn
and Yemen. The U.S. Government, the Department of
Defense (DoD), and the international community are
devoting increasing resources to fighting extremism
in the region, hoping to subdue a devastating trend of
chaos caused by Islamic radicals. As our focus on the
al-Qa’ida (AQ) affiliated al-Shabaab group continues,
so must our focus on developing an increasingly wise
toolbox with which to defeat its cause. Thus, policymakers must seriously assess al-Shabaab’s strengths
and weaknesses to allow CT efforts in the region the
upper hand in fighting an international terrorist ideology.
The people of Somalia live in a state of decay from
day to day, not knowing if their lives will end. For
the last 2 years, southern and central Somalia has been
embroiled in a conflict ostensibly based on religion. It
is a conflict intimately tied to notions of national liberation, clan loyalties, and admittedly varying interpretations of Islam. The aggressive nature of the conflict
has resulted in thousands of deaths, the destruction
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of sacred monuments, and brother-on-brother, clanon-clan battles. The battle lines have been drawn in
the sand. On one side, there is the Somali Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) and its African Union
(AU) and international supporters. On the other side,
there is the the Mujahidin Youth Movement (MYM),
also known as al-Shabaab, and its affiliated fighters
and militias.1
The battle between these two groups has been
waged on the streets of Mogadishu, in the desolate
towns and villages of central and southern Somalia,
and through a sophisticated media and online front.2
Al-Shabaab has gained increasing attention in the last
year from friends and enemies within Somalia and the
Horn of Africa, the Muslim world, and international
counterterrorism experts. The group has been warmly
praised by AQ and several of its regional affiliates in
the past year, and rhetorical support from independent salafi-jihadis has demonstrated growing interest
in the Somali theater. Indeed, the MYM’s increased
popularity and resonance as it engages in battles on
the ground and in the virtual world of jihadi web forums has been astonishing, especially considering the
group’s relatively recent formation as an independent
organization with minimal local guidance and financial support from al-Qa’ida Central (AQC).
However, careful analysis of the MYM’s strategy
reveals multiple vulnerabilities that analysts should
be able to counter with a strategic campaign. A synchronized effort by the United States, the AU, and
TFG agencies may result in limiting the success that
the MYM has enjoyed over the last several years. This
monograph provides an assessment of vulnerabilities
which, if aggressively attacked, could result in the reduction of the MYM’s manipulative ability.
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BACKGROUND
Continuing instability in Somalia today has increased concern that terrorists who seek to establish
a foothold in Africa will use insecure places as safe
havens and launching pads. Several attempts have
been made to establish lawful governments; however,
warlord and clan interests have managed to take center stage among the population. Local leaders have
been unwilling to subordinate themselves to a national-level form of government. This unwillingness and
grassroots focus has resulted in the establishment of
local militias, formed to protect the interests of clans
and their leaders.
These militias have maintained order within their
jurisdictional boundaries when threatened by external
forces, when clan leaders wanted to enforce their decisions, or when emergencies required an organized
force to assist in the relief effort. Following years of
this sort of military arrangement, a group of leaders
believed clan militias could not defend the interests
of the Somali people; therefore, they formed an organization called the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). The
UIC is also referred to by others as the Islamic Courts
Union (ICU).
The UIC/ICU’s intent was to provide a nationallevel decisionmaking organization, form a military,
and start consolidating grassroots leadership into a
Somali government. Unfortunately, key leaders disagreed on whether to adopt a nationalistic versus a
hard-line Islamic focus. Those propagating the Islamic
focus attracted the attention of the United States and
several neighboring countries, due to their ties to AQ
and involvement in the recruitment and training of
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jihadist fighters for the struggles in Iraq, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and other locations where caliphates
had been declared by Islamic fundamentalists. Subsequently, in 2006, Ethiopian armed forces crossed the
border, dissolving the UIC and returning Somalia to
the hands of local militias.
Ethiopian forces attempted to provide peace enforcement operations in Somalia; however, they faced
opposition from groups which were now united in
the determination to regain control of Somalia and establish an Islamic form of government. These groups
would later form the basis for the establishment of the
MYM and its allies, who will be described later in this
paper. In 2007, the AU authorized the deployment of
up to 8,500 troops to maintain order in Somalia and
assist, guide, and provide security to the TFG for the
establishment of its rule. Before we examine the vulnerabilities of the MYM, in order to provide a balanced
assessment we will briefly examine the vulnerabilities
of the TFG.
TFG Vulnerabilities.
The government of Somalia has demonstrated a
willingness to reach out to various competing groups.
However, its new and immature leadership, in combination with competing hard-line Islamic groups,
continues to push it to the edge of failure. Specifically,
the TFG is vulnerable because it remains unable to
provide the people of Somalia a secure environment
in which to live and work, unable to win the strategic communications war, and unable to develop and
negotiate a long-term strategic national plan which
would result in a peaceful nation.
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ROLE OF ISLAM AND CLANS IN SOMALIA
Some of the parties who are trying to overthrow
the government now are increasingly using Islam as
a mechanism to increase popular support. To fully
appreciate the Somali situation, it is important to understand the role Islam has taken in Somalia as both a
populist response to perceived Western encroachment
and as a type of political order to fill the governance
gap that has persisted for nearly 2 decades.
First and foremost, it is important to note that Islam
in Somalia was not always practiced with extremism.
Mystical Sufi brotherhoods have long been prevalent
in Somali Islam. Alongside a peaceful Islamic current,
however, there has also been a more reactionary, extremist one. Socialism in the 1950s and 1960s diminished the role of Muslim leaders, and certain institutions traditionally controlled by religious scholars
were transferred to secular authorities. Although the
new government was professedly Islamic, its actions
both disenfranchised and disenchanted some Somalis
who followed the regional current of Islamic revivalism. The upswing in fundamentalism in the Middle
East in the late 1970s and early 1980s also impacted Somalia, which was geographically close enough to the
Arabian Peninsula to be influenced by certain Islamic
fundamentalist teachings. Additionally, a xenophobic
trend grew in tandem with an increasingly extremist
religious trend. Distrust of outsiders and past persecution of Muslims by Westerners have long fueled antiWestern rhetoric in Somali mosques. Indeed, Western
nations have intervened in Somalia since the British
and Italians picked apart the country in the 19th century. Whereas mistrust of foreigners and their types of
governance is commonplace, Islam offered and offers
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an alternative framework for rule and law that is perceived by some to be more indigenous and authentic.
On a political level, it is important to note that Islam has filled a gap in Somalia for a very specific reason—the ICU and other Muslim social and political
structures have offered services and structure where
successive attempts at central governments have
failed since the early 1990s. In the last 10 years ‘Ulema
(Islamic scholars or religious leaders) have gained
popular support both within the clans and among average Somalis. More recently, the possibility of a strict
implementation of sharia (the all-encompassing legal
order given by God and based on the Quran and the
subsequent body of Islamic law) has become a central
contention of Islamists seeking to gain control.3 Finally, it is also of note that some Islamic teachings encourage the removal of leaders if they fail to provide
for the welfare of the community. This may explain
both the confrontation between Islamic extremists and
successive governments as well as the continuous infighting between the clans.
Clan Politics.
Intra- and inter-clan fighting in Somalia can be explained partially in terms of clan organizational structure and the multiple barriers inherent in the system
which impede unity and contribute to instability in
society. First of all, clan culture allows for the questioning of leaders at the tribal, regional, or national
level. When leaders gain authority, they often have
not developed means for the lowest members of the
group to feel like valued members of the organization. Furthermore, many leaders have not instituted
symbols to bind members and create loyalty within
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the clan. In addition to the absence of such symbols
or slogans, many leaders have also not used Islamic
teachings to create an underlying doctrine to nurture
followers and create synergy.4
The lack of an educated and informed membership
poses an impediment to clan unity while also facilitating the attractiveness of clan membership. Somali
clans include a hodgepodge of youths and uneducated men and women from villages—often with no family or ethnic background in common. Whereas people
who are tied ethnically tend to be more wary of fighting one another, the absence of blood ties means that
intertribe conflict occurs more often. Additionally,
lack of education plays a role in clan membership and
instability. According to the UN Unite for Children
website, only 22 percent of school-aged children attend school.5 This has profoundly impacted the literacy of the total population, which is slightly less than
38 percent.6 This lack of an educated public makes
clan membership more desirable and attractive, since
the only skills required are the ability to follow orders
and carry a weapon.
The idea of sacrificing such uneducated, low-level
clan members appears acceptable to many senior clan
leaders. Some charismatic clan leaders may justify
most intertribal fighting according to a need to gain
power, while savvy Islamic clan leaders legitimize
their fighting as a jihad, or holy war.7 According to
the latter, Muslims have a duty to fight nonbelievers.
This means that many low-level clan members are essentially expendable to the upper-level leadership.
Finally, clan leadership turnover may be a result of
a lack of anything akin to a military’s “Non- Commissioned Officer” (NCO) Corps. An NCO Corps represents a form of middle-management which can provide
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hands-on supervision to young low-level members
who do not feel a symbiotic sense of allegiance to their
leadership; this absence of an NCO corps allows for
the possibility that another charismatic leader can garner support to help topple the leadership. Essentially,
clan politics is a cycle of one leader following another
promising to look after the members. When the leader
fails to provide for the good of the clan, clan culture
allows for the replacement of the leader. This cycle
will continue to affect Somali society because leadership fragility and organizational flux is not conducive
to attaining a long-term, negotiated peace.8
Methodology.
Methodologies for organizing information on insurgent groups are often hyperanalytical or far too
technical, forcing intelligence or operational planners
to disregard them as merely analytical tools rather
than useful frameworks to inform decisionmaking.
We endeavored to find a more basic design to optimize user-friendliness and encourage applicability in
multiple future scenarios. Figure 1 depicts the MYM’s
vulnerabilities, which were organized using the following four sources of national power for the purpose
of this assessment: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME).9 Our next consideration
was whether the vulnerability occurs at the strategic,
operational, or tactical level (SOT) of war.10 To clarify
our SOT analysis, we are defining “strategic” as when
the TFG, the international community, or the MYM
and its allies seek to enforce or influence security objectives and guidance, and develop and use national
or international resources to achieve these objectives.
Furthermore, we define “operational” as when cam-
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paigns and major operations are planned, conducted,
and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within Somalia and the Horn of Africa. Finally, we define “tactical” as where battles and engagements are planned
and executed to achieve objectives assigned to tactical
units or task forces. This is where the local community
is influenced to provide or deny support.11

Figure 1. Composite of al-Shabaab Vulnerabilities.
While intended to provide a lens into the power
of nation-states, the DIME framework can be applied cautiously in the case of al-Shabaab, for while
it is technically a nonstate actor, as it evolves from an
organism to a more regimented organization, it in-
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creasingly utilizes tools similar to those used by state
organs, particularly in the military and informational
domains. This is even further true as the organization
continues to operate in a state of war against elements
of a national government and international troops—
causing it to counter many of their national structures.
Several additional caveats are in order here. This
methodology is not intended to suggest a typology
applicable to all militant structures, either in the Horn
of Africa or elsewhere. Indeed, it must be noted that
not every organization operates in all four vectors. In
the aftermath of September 11, 2001, several explanations of salafi-jihadi Islamist movements have been
put forward. Arguments for organizations like AQ
as hierarchical, networks of franchise or, conversely,
pockets of leaderless resistance have caused significant debate.12 In reality, salafi-jihadi actors exist in all
three types of structures; none of these theories are
mutually exclusive, although not all elements may
be present in each one. For instance, in a self-starting
group with no distinct leadership, the diplomatic and
informational vectors may be virtually irrelevant in
individual cells. Likewise, very little is known about
the current organization of al-Shabaab, other than its
relative decentralization, so the methodology applied
here analyzes the main messages and actions coming
from the official center, which does appear to operate
within the DIME paradigm. This methodology is useful as a mechanism for visualizing certain vulnerabilities of radical groups, regardless of the groups’ level
of centralization and irrespective of whether their cell
structures are top-down or bottom-up.
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MYM Vulnerabilities.
As previously mentioned, the current MYM organization and structure is difficult to know with any certainty. Estimates of local cell composition and strength,
along with their concrete religious disposition, vary
across scholars and analysts, with projections ranging
from hundreds to thousands of members. Frequent
MYM leadership changes, and challenges in pinning
down the identity of personnel under pseudonyms,
further complicates any detailed analysis.
The MYM’s current leadership hails from different
backgrounds and nationalities, complicating the task
of ascribing a singular strategy to disparate, decentralized operating groups. Some leaders have combat
experience in Afghanistan or other theaters, and their
rhetoric suggests they see jihad in Somalia as part of
a coordinated global effort. Other leaders and collaborators are more focused on providing order so that
Somalia and its people can emerge from poverty, the
misrule of clan warlords, and turnstile transitional
governments. Likewise, their individual adherence
to various hardcore salafi-jihadi ideology remains in
question. Figure 1 is a composite of the vulnerabilities
identified, given the limited open source information
on the MYM. The remainder of this monograph will
provide a description of the vulnerabilities and recommended capabilities that can be applied to limit the
MYM .
Goals.
For the purposes of this analysis, vulnerabilities
are measured with respect to what we identify as the
strategic goals of the MYM based on an extensive re-
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view of their propaganda and literature. The objectives of the MYM’s grand strategy include expelling
Ethiopians and foreign peacekeeping forces, delegitimizing and expelling the TFG of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh
Ahmed,13 implementing a puritan form of sharia, and
eventually establishing one contiguous Islamic emirate in Somalia. Judging by its propaganda, the group
is keen on accepting as many fighters —local and international —as necessary to reach this goal.14 Indeed,
estimates of foreign fighters operating in Somalia currently range from 280 to 450.15 At the same time, it
should be noted that high-level agreement about more
transnational aims, which largely coincide with AQC
strategy, depends on individual leaders, and is most
closely associated with those MYM figures who have
direct contact with AQ.16 Given a basic understanding
of the goals, we can now move on to the likely vulnerabilities.
Diplomatic-Strategic Vulnerabilities.
MYM Strategy: Gain national and international support, relevance and legitimacy. Both the MYM and the
government of President Sharif have sought the support of the Somali people and neighboring countries.17
In their struggle to influence the public, the TFG has
been endorsed and subsequently supported with financial aid and weapons by the UN, the AU, and the
international community. This international legitimacy could limit the MYM’s ability to gain international
support, acceptance, and ultimately relevance beyond
the Somali terrorist context. Indeed, unless the TFG
does something viewed as unethical or irresponsible,
it will continue to be supported by international and
AU governments regardless of its battle losses to the
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al-Shabaab, making the MYM’s attainment of its strategic goals difficult.
Perhaps more important, Somali and external religious clerical groups have endorsed the TFG. The
MYM has not been endorsed by recognized Somali Islamic leaders, in part because it has assassinated multiple leading clerics who disagree substantively with
its use of violence. Even the leadership of the HizbulIslam (HI) alliance, with whom the MYM is loosely
affiliated, only agrees on certain elements key to the
MYM’s strategy.18
The TFG and international community must continue to seek clerical legitimacy and endorsement in
order to gain the support of the local population, since
the people tend to believe their religious leaders and
often seek their guidance.19 It is difficult to determine
how long the TFG will continue to receive aid and
public support, especially if it shows limited results
in its ability to provide basic services and protection
to the public.
Diplomatic—Operational Vulnerabilities.
MYM Strategy: Gain local provincial and clan support, relevance and legitimacy, particularly with respect
to Islam. As stated before, multiple Somali and external religious clerical groups have endorsed the TFG.
Such groups furnish an important form of legitimacy
in a war increasingly waged utilizing Islamic rhetoric.
Since January 2009, the MYM’s alliance with the more
politically pragmatic HI has not resulted in any endorsements by other moderate Islamic organizations
within the country. While the MYM may not be actively seeking support from such organizations, this
support would assist in gaining endorsement from
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Somalis still unsure of whom to support. In addition,
gaining popular support of moderates would increase
MYM influence throughout Somalia and among the
international community.
Somali moderate Islamic organizations and civic
groups, such as the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ), the
Organization of Somali Religious Scholars, the Hawiye Cultural and Unity Council, the National Reconciliation Committee, and several civic and professional
organizations, have actually endorsed the TFG and
expressed their desire for peace.20 The MYM has, in
fact, alienated these organizations and their members
because of its commitment to violence and unwillingness to negotiate. Moreover, these and several other
organizations have influenced their members and
international supporters to align themselves with the
TFG, hoping that international pressure will force the
MYM to the negotiating table with the TFG.
The aforementioned organizations have criticized
the MYM for its aversion to compromise with the TFG
and its determination to seek Taliban-style sharia.
That such organizations seek both peace and stability is in direct contrast to the violent path the MYM
has adopted in realization of its goals. As long as the
MYM rejects peace and continues to attack AU and
TFG forces, these moderate groups will continue to
reject MYM claims for leadership of the country.21
Diplomatic-Tactical Vulnerabilities.
MYM Strategy: Promote the use of Islamic law, stability and security in order to garner further public support
and emphasize ground campaign capability. The MYM’s
rigorous enforcement in most areas of Taliban-style
sharia has resulted in the loss of public support from
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Somali and international groups and leaders.22 While
the MYM’s enforcement of sharia has been recognized
and supported by AQC leadership and their affiliates,
it has also resulted in the TFG and neighboring countries using this against the MYM in the ongoing public
information war.23 In some cases the group’s active
propaganda message about this has backfired. For instance, when hardcore Islamic law was instituted and
publicized in the southern border city of Kismayo, one
of the first areas to come under official MYM control,
the outcome resulted in considerable chafing on the
part of the local population. The Islamic administrations set up from Baidoa have concentrated largely on
service provision. Indeed, the propaganda from the
summer suggests the MYM’s pragmatism as it moved
from exploiting harsh sharia punishments to enumerating its services in favor of Somali security.24
In one sense, the inconsistent application of sharia
across MYM-controlled locales gives insight into the
semi-fluidity of its strategy; it is proof that the group
has proven itself flexible depending on the reaction of
locals. At the same time, it brings up the more important issue that the MYM’s dispersed cellular structure
and organization has not resulted in a synchronized
propaganda or kinetic campaign. Analysis of its attacks on TFG and AU forces has shown that attacks
seem to be uncoordinated between MYM units in
central and southern Somalia. In addition, MYM’s
military attacks look to be local, with no centralized
command and control organization nor a continued
reinforcement of forces after capture of key cities or
resources. In fact, the holding of key terrain or parts of
the country seems to be temporary, with no long-term
strategy.25
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MEDIA STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
Before discussing the MYM’s informational vulnerabilities, it is important to gain an understanding
of the media strategy that the MYM is employing.
The MYM understands the criticality of spreading the
word of its jihad in Somalia to the greater worldwide
Islamic community. This attracts foreign fighters or
refugees seeking to return to Somalia, gains financial
support, and also obtains greater worldwide media
exposure. Without it, the likelihood of victory, especially against a government supported by the AU,
the international community, and Somali moderate
groups, will be limited. Thus, the MYM has taken a
three-pronged approach to its media campaign:
1. Partnering with the Global Islamic Media Front
(GIMF) and Establishment of MYM Websites: This
medium serves as the base for dissemination of battlefront reports, recruitment videos, videos showcasing
AU forces being attacked, pre-suicide bomber testimonies, and postings for both AQ and MYM senior
leadership seeking public support and giving words
of encouragement.
2. Development of an Online Magazine: In October
2008, MYM produced a new propaganda magazine,
Millat Ibrahim, which was printed in Arabic, with articles focusing on a variety of topics, including battlefield tactics, influencing the people through media
messages, religious justification to attack TFG and
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces,
and forming relationships with other jihadist organizations. Contributors included Somali academics, religious leaders, or other well-known individuals from
the online jihadi forum discussions.
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3. News Conferences, Interviews, and Online
Chat Sessions with Senior MYM Leadership: Sheikh
Mukhtar Robow, who was the former official spokesman for the MYM, has given multiple interviews
over Al-Jazeera and other Arab networks; however,
other senior and mid-level MYM leaders have also
taken advantage of the availability of news reporters
in Somalia. Whether at press conferences or private
interviews, since January 2009 MYM leaders have addressed the need for support in Somalia as well as the
need to change TFG leadership by ousting President
Shaykh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. They have also praised
AQC leadership and supporting media infrastructure
for their role in publicizing the struggle in Somalia.
Figure 2 depicts media strategy and propaganda of
the MYM.

Figure 2. Media and Propaganda Strategies.

17

It is important to note here that the MYM’s media campaign depends on the GIMF for its reach into
the outside world because of its inability to sustain its
websites. MYM leadership has indicated its appreciation to the GIMF for assisting its propaganda efforts,
and has acknowledged its technological shortfalls
against Western efforts to block MYM website information dissemination.26 The MYM announced the
creation of a new media arm on December 20, 2009,
in order to confront “global challenges.”27 It may be
expected that the MYM’s media bent will become increasingly international in the coming months.
Information-Strategic Vulnerabilities.
MYM Strategy: Recruit and self-promote using information technology such as the internet and AQ-affiliated
media conglomerates. Despite its diplomatic shortcomings, the MYM has enjoyed the support of AQC-affiliated information websites and publicity affiliates
in the last several years. Many of these are surprisingly high-tech and visually striking, perhaps making
the TFG’s public pronouncements look amateurish
in comparison.28 However, over the last year, MYMhosted websites have been taken down or disrupted
by allies of the TFG. When this occurs, the MYM has
had to depend solely on AQC websites and their correspondents for dissemination of tactical victories,
magazines, videos, and forum bulletin board announcements. Dependency on someone else’s website
leaves the MYM vulnerable. Indeed, the fact that its
last three websites have been disrupted points to its
lack of skills in the cyber-warfare arena.29
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Information-Operational Vulnerabilities.
MYM Strategy: Indoctrinate followers with military
and political objectives. In addition to being dependent
on AQC websites for disseminating their information, the top leadership of the MYM seems to have
varying strategic communication messages. Current
MYM Emir Abu Zubayr has long placed Somalia at
the center of AQ’s transnational project, imbuing it
with both strategic and theological-historical importance.30 Other leaders have been less sweeping and
historical in their statements. Longtime spokesman,
Sheikh Mukhtar Robow spoke several times about
the MYM’s independence from AQ and the need to
consider national objectives first, before expanding
beyond Somalia’s border. HI Leader Hassan al-Turki
has also advocated a “Somalia first” strategy.31 Robow’s messages may have led to his removal in May
2009; however, there have been other instances where
MYM’s top leaders have expressed differing military
and political objectives.32 Current MYM spokesperson Ali Raghe has said Somalia must be fully liberated before contemplating international expansion.33
Indeed, given the inconsistency in statements, and the
probable lack of consensus on what, if anything, to do
beyond Somalia, MYM actions have taken an overwhelmingly domestic course thus far.
Information-Tactical Vulnerabilities.
MYM Strategy: Emphasize local victories to build
morale and recruit further ideological adherents and/or
foot soldiers. In the information operations war being
waged on the internet, the MYM has published daily accounts of its tactical victories over the TFG and
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AU. These can serve as words of encouragement to
affiliated fighters. At the same time, despite claiming
victories and destruction of TFG and AU resources,
there does not seem to be a long-term sustainment or
capitulation of these areas. 34 For example, a 2009 UN/
AMISOM and MYM web release suggests that the
MYM and the ASWJ have battled over cities in western Somalia, and MYM/HI and TFG/AMISOM forces
have fought over neighborhoods in Mogadishu only
to hold them temporarily, until the other counteracted
with a larger force, or MYM forces were withdrawn
because they were needed elsewhere within Somalia.35 These MYM daily battle accounts could have a
negative impact on recruitment of locals, since they
imply the group would rather be violent than go to the
peace table. Therefore, the MYM may unintentionally
be labeled as uncooperative and always seeking military conflict. In addition, moderate and even hard-line
Islamists may tire of this publicity with no tangible
results or strategic outcomes.36
Military-Strategic Vulnerabilities.
MYM Strategy: Aggregate and recruit followers around
certain military personalities. The MYM has showcased
a number of leaders, each giving interviews, directing
forces in the field, and developing their own followers. Yet, AQC propaganda and open source reporting
suggests that these independent leaders may have
their own agendas. The fact that AQC leadership has
not formerly acknowledged anyone within the MYM
as its military leader indicates that there is no single
individual leading the MYM.37 This, in turn, points to
the lack of a grand strategy and operational concept.38
While Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubayr is allegedly the
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emir of the MYM, no public or published announcements indicate that he provides strategic guidance or
political, military, or informational objectives to other
MYM senior leaders. In fact, in a military perspective,
he does not hold other MYM senior leaders accountable in the sense of a true chain of command.
Military-Operational Vulnerabilities.
MYM Strategy: Utilize fighters from anywhere as foot
soldiers in the MYM cause. The MYM dependency on
foreign fighters may delegitimize its argument that Somalis support its struggle against the TFG. Reporting
suggests that within the MYM military structure, both
leaders and foot soldiers originate from Middle Eastern (i.e., Arabic-speaking countries,) as well as, from
English-speaking nations. Recently, in a recruitment
video, an American named Abu Mansur Al-Amriki
was featured leading a MYM unit. In addition, antiterrorist law enforcement officials have apprehended
Somali diaspora attempting to migrate back to Somalia. When asked, they claimed that they were answering a call to join the jihad in Somalia.
Finally, AQC leadership, including senior military leader Abu Yahya Al-Libi, has called on Muslims
worldwide to join the MYM in its struggle.39 This dependency on foreign fighters may indicate local Somali youth are either rejecting or refusing to join the
MYM’s fight against the TFG.40 Indeed, experts suggest the MYM is increasingly seen as a tool of foreign
extremists wreaking havoc (for example, the non-Somali tactic of suicide bombing) locally at the expense
of already downtrodden residents.41
Finally, the continuing struggle between the MYM
and the TFG has resulted in the deaths of MYM key
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leaders and catalyzed the creation of rifts among MYM
and HI senior leaders. For example, the deaths of key
leaders Saleh Ali Nabhan and Aden Hashi Ayro42 and
the removal or diminishing of authority of former alShabaab spokesperson Abu Mansur and HI figures
Dr. Umar Iman Abubakar and Hassan Al-Turki may
reveal disagreements on where both the MYM or the
HI should be heading. While there is little insitutional
centralization, dependency on a core of leaders with
military operational experience has left the MYM vulnerable to losing momentum. Without an effective
training and replacement system, this makes it vulnerable to losing military engagements, as well as the
information war with the TFG. Over the last 2 years,
the MYM has lost leadership at the regional and operational levels. Since the MYM does not have a formal
military advancement system, in-fighting between
field commanders may occur as key leaders are killed.
Admittedly, the group’s success often has more to do
with the local milieu than with charismatic leadership.
The movement is not personality-driven, and it is important to admit that leaders’ deaths provide propaganda material to the more ideological members, as
well as to al-Qa’ida and its affiliates.43
Military–Tactical Vulnerabilities.
MYM Strategy: Wage a multi-front war against Ethiopians, remaining present African forces, the TFG, and
Westerners in general. The MYM continues to fight a
multifront, multienemy, and multilevel war. Sustaining it may be difficult, especially if the TFG receives
additional resources from the United States, the UN,
and the AU. The MYM has a host of enemies, includ-
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ing the TFG, the AU, moderate Islamic organizations,
and neighboring countries whose forces are growing
rapidly. In addition, AU and UN policymakers will
be providing the TFG with an information operations
capability in addition to advisors on nation-building.
With the increase in external resources and committed TFG leadership, the MYM’s ability to recruit and
resource its struggle will be limited. In the last few
months, U.S. administration and AU leaders have
committed themselves to helping the TFG defeat
the MYM. The MYM’s continued rejection of peace,
coupled with an impatience by Somalia moderate and
civic organizations, will undoubtedly result in the
MYM’s loss of influence to an ever-growing TFG and
its allies.44
Economic-Strategic Vulnerabilities.
MYM Strategy: Gain funding from international and
local allies. While several high-profile members seem
to be indoctrinated and have fought jihad in other theaters, economic incentives are rumored to be a major
factor in MYM recruitment and sustainment of foot
solders.45 Money is also important for providing local stability and buying new weapons. Given a local
economy in ruins, MYM’s dependency on the overseas Somali diaspora makes it vulnerable to shortfalls
in funding if this support were cut off at the source.
Somali diaspora living in Western countries have provided funding to MYM, which, in turn, has been used
to pay for weapons, salaries, and other resources.46
Western intelligence agencies and anti-terrorist organizations’ identification and neutralization of this
support system could result in the MYM shifting dependency to the Somali population and political sup-
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porters—such as Eritrea and other AQ affiliates.47 As
noted earlier, the Somali population’s inclination for
peace has largely alienated the MYM from this source
of income.
Economic-Operational Vulnerabilities.
MYM Strategy: Get funding for MYM operations. One
of the biggest vulnerabilities the MYM contends with
is competition for resources with other Islamic organizations. The creation of the HI in January 2009 has
had both positive and negative effects on the MYM.
While elements of the HI can be counted on to provide
manpower or reinforcements on a tactical level, the
HI also competes with the MYM on a funding level.
HI and MYM financial leaders both appeal to the local Somali public, but also to the Somali diaspora in
Western countries. Perhaps even more difficult for
the MYM, is the fact that the HI is composed of four
organizations merged into one.48 Combined, their resources are likely to be sent to a larger organization
with proven and established leadership. Finally, HI
and MYM leaders support one another only as long
as it serves the interests of their organizations, which
clearly differ on long-term strategies. In a land where
brothers fight each other, alliances are temporary and
turning to the other side is not uncommon. Both TFG
incentives and offers for influential positions may
tempt HI leadership to side with President Sharif and
his government.49
Economic-Tactical Vulnerabilities.
MYM Strategy: Consolidate resources and support by
clans affiliated with the MYM. The MYM’s base of sup-
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port permeates from clans that provide both leaders
and foot soldiers. Clans in Somali have for the most
part attempted to remain neutral in the struggle for
Somalia, switching sides, as either the MYM or the
TFG/AU/ASWJ capture or recapture villages and
towns. Clan elders and civic organizations continue to
be interested in which group will bring basic services
and peace to their people, not one which will enforce
a particular form of sharia.50 The MYM’s continued
violent attacks and persistence on the Taliban-style of
sharia has alienated clans, forcing others to join the
TFG or ASWJ.51 In the long run, MYM rule by fear has
clan leaders willing to compromise and accept MYM
regional civil administrations; however, acceptance of
the MYM is balanced between surviving today and
enduring for tomorrow.
DEFEAT MECHANISMS
Now that we have explained the MYM vulnerabilities and media strategy, we will provide recommendations on what efforts or capabilities may be
leveraged in defeating or deterring the MYM and its
erstwhile allies. We emphasize here that the instruments for defeating the MYM or limiting its influence
do not have to be kinetic or military in nature, but can
be diplomatic, economic, or persuasive. The following
paragraphs provide examples of what instruments of
national power/capabilities or organizations can support, defeat, or deter the MYM’s campaign. This manuscript will only provide examples of the diplomatic
and informational aspects of the DIME vulnerabilities.
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Diplomatic/Strategic.
• International community supports the TFG:
— Efforts should be made by U.S. and UN strategic communication planners to highlight
in Somalia that the TFG has gained the support of Islamic scholars, UN organizations,
and other pan-Islamic and African organizations. This can be done by media, radio
broadcasts, the internet, and grass-rootslevel newspapers and pamphlets throughout Somalia.
Diplomatic/Operational.
• Moderate islamist groups support the TFG:
— Efforts should be made to provide material support to moderate Islamist groups
and local clan leaders to counter economic,
military, and informational advantages the
MYM has gained within its areas of influence. These moderate groups need to be
vetted by UN or regional organizations to
ensure there is no corruption and fair distribution of material or funds.
Diplomatic/Tactical.
• Dispersed cellular organizational leaders:
— Efforts should be made to negotiate with
MYM leaders who seem to have disagreements with mainstream MYM leaders. Gestures of formal power, positions within the
TFG parliament, humanitarian aid, or as-
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sistance with the establishment of economic
aid for their population may encourage these
leaders to break away from hard-line MYM
leaders.
Informational/Operational.
• Rifts in MYM leadership:
— Efforts should be made to publicize and
highlight the rifts that are materializing in
MYM leadership. Third parties should introduce peace options to senior leadership
within the MYM who appear tired of conflict
and may seek compromise.
Informational/Tactical.
•	Disregard/disrespect of Somali religious clerics/daily battle reports with no long-term effects:
— Efforts should be made to consolidate and
publicize the sermons, announcements, and
public interviews of leading Somali ‘ulema
who have supported the TFG. In addition,
TFG and senior clerics need to denounce
and issue fatwas against MYM leaders who
assassinate clerical leaders. Holding meetings and conferences with religious leaders in Somalia or Yemen to develop peace
strategies, and broadcasting outcomes and
findings in support of peace, would limit or
delegitimize the MYM’s violent campaign.
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STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review provides insight into what role the U.S. military will play in Africa.52 Echoing similar strategic objectives, General
William Ward’s testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee on March 9, 2010, acknowledged
AFRICOM’s partnership with the AMISOM countries.53 Recognizing the limited extent of U.S. support
to Somalia—that of supporting AMISOM forces preparing for their deployment into Somalia—raises the
question, “Is supporting AMISOM forces enough to
prevent the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Africa?”
From a regional viewpoint, Somalia has been
in the middle of U.S. efforts to counter the growing
threat in Africa. AQ views Somalia as a stepping stone
for submerging the rest of Africa into an Islamic caliphate. For nearly 20 years, Somalia’s economically
depressed population has been caught in the center
of inter- and intraclan battles, rotating Somali governments, and the worst humanitarian disaster to hit an
African country in years. These conditions have made
the country attractive to Islamic fundamentalist determined on making Somalia a safe haven for AQ—a
haven where jihadists can hone their tactical skills and
return to other areas within the Middle East where
they can engage against the United States and its allies. Some analysts have even suggested that Somalia
is becoming an unofficial al-Qa’ida exchange program.
Contrary to U.S. official public statements, Somali military leaders have publicly stated that the
U.S. military is providing support in identifying and
neutralizing MYM and AQ leadership.54 Regardless
of the extent of U.S. military involvement there, what
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the United States does in Somalia will have ramifications throughout the Horn of Africa, the greater
African continent, and perhaps worldwide. Relying
on AMISOM forces to assist the Somali government,
while a positive gesture, has done little to degrade
MYM capabilities and influence. Waiting too long and
entrusting AMISOM forces to prevent expansion of
the MYM and AQ will unnecessarily be putting neighboring countries and the world at risk.55 Strategically
gambling on AMISOM to improve Somali government capabilities has yet to pay off. In March 2010,
the UN pointed to the lack of progress and increased
influence of the jihadists. Maybe a more aggressive
strategy is needed to safeguard the region and world
against this growing threat.
CONCLUSION
The existence of the MYM depends on many factors, including its ability to recruit soldiers, provide
weapons of war to these soldiers, obtain support either abroad or at home, and continue to appeal to the
Somali population. Its battles have been brilliantly executed, with hundreds of AU and TFG forces losing
their lives or withdrawing from Somalia. That said,
the MYM does have vulnerabilities, and this monograph provided an explanation of the SOT vulnerabilities, organized along the DIME model. In addition,
this monograph provided examples of what actions
the TFG or its allies could take in the diplomatic and
informational areas, which are perhaps two of the easiest areas to implement immediately, given conditions
on the ground. Not addressed in this monograph, due
to time and length constraints, were the military and
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economic aspects of the vulnerabilities. A coalition of
UN, AU, TFG, and U.S. operational planners can further refine these vulnerabilities and apply operational
capabilities, which could result in the limitation of
MYM influence in Somalia and abroad.
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